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CHAPTER 13 OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
OF 1978: AN ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE
Melvin Kaplan*
Individual debtors with regular incomes may elect to repay their debts
with a chapter 13 periodic payment plan. Mr. Kaplan points out the sig-
nificant changes the new Bankruptcy Code effectuates in chapter 13 relief.
He discusses the advantages available to consumer-debtors who wish to
avoid a bankruptcy liquidation by choosing a rehabilitation plan under
chapter 13. In conclusion, Mr. Kaplan predicts that eligible debtors in-
creasingly will choose this form of relief as its value becomes apparent.
One of the least understood and most erratically applied of the federal
bankruptcy statutes, I chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act 2 was intended as a
rehabilitating device for insolvent wage earners.3 Chapter 13 of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978,4 although it introduces significant changes, re-
mains true to the original purpose. Chapter 13 allows the consumer-debtor
to adopt a plan for making periodic payments to a bankruptcy trustee, who
in turn distributes the funds to the creditors. The debtor is thus protected
from creditor harassment and avoids the stigma of a bankruptcy liquidation. 5
* The author practices insolvency law in Chicago, Illinois. B.A., Roosevelt University; J.D.,
I.I.T. Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3, 14 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
2. Chapter XIII was added to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1897-99),
by the Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 930 (1938) (originally codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1086
(1976)) (repealed 1979). Because chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act did not appear until 1938,
with the passage of the Chandler Act, all citations to former chapter XIII will be to the
Chandler Act. The rules that have been promulgated under the former Act will continue to
govern bankruptcy practice to the extent that they are consistent with the provisions of the new
Act. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405(d), 92 Stat. 2549. While the
Supreme Court has the authority to promulgate new rules for bankruptcy practice, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2075 (Supp. I 1978), this Article will cite to the rules presently in existence-those formu-
lated under the former Act.
3. SENATE REPORT supra note 1, at 12.
4. 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1330 (Supp. II 1978). As this Article was prepared for publica-
tion, the most current codification of the Bankruptcy Code was the 1978 Supplement to the
United States Code, in which title 11 is set forth in an appendix. Throughout this Article, title
11 will be cited as 11 U.S.C. app. § - (Supp. II 1978).
5. See Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 395 (1966), rehearing denied, 384 U.S.
934 (1966). While the debtor is making payments under the court-supervised plan, creditors
may not move against the debtor through garnishments, attachments, or any other means. 11
U.S.C. app. § 362(a) (Supp. 11 1978); Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 401.
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Wage earner plans 6 have been encouraged, and implemented success-
fully, in Chicago and many other areas 7 as a realistic alternative to straight
bankruptcy;" in other districts, however, chapter 13 petitions have been
filed rarely or never. 9 Reasons for this diversity in use may be traced to
flaws in the former Act, 10 as well as to attorneys' and judges' hesitation to
encourage what they may perceive to be an administratively burdensome
procedure. 11
A debtor who considered filing a chapter XIII petition under the former
Act was confronted with numerous barriers to achieving the ultimate goal of
relief from creditor pressures. For example, to be eligible for a chapter XIII
plan, the debtor had to be a person whose principal income was derived
from wages or commissions. 12 Self-employed persons, such as sole
proprietors-although their financial situation often was comparable to that
of individual wage earners-were often unable to participate in chapter XIII
relief. Additionally, debtors were ineligible for a hardship discharge unless
they had been under the wage earner plan for three years. 13 Other defects
in the former chapter XIII included the requirement that a majority of un-
secured creditors consent to the debtor's plan, 14 the lack of protection for a
6. Under the former Bankruptcy Act, wage earner was defined to mean "an individual
whose principal income is derived from wages, salaries or commissions." Chandler Act, ch. 575,
§ 606, 52 Stat. 930 (1938), as amended by Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 52, 66 Stat. 437
(originally codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1006(8) (1976)) (repealed 1979). The new Act eliminates the
requirement that the debtor be a wage earner by substituting the phrase "individual with regu-
lar income.'" 11 U.S.C. app. § 101(24) (Supp. II 1978). See text accompanying notes 21-28 infra.
7. See THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT,
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., part I, 157 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMIS-
SION REPORT], where the Commission noted the extensive use of wage earner plans by judicial
districts in Alabama, Ohio, California, Georgia, Tennessee, Kansas, and Maine.
8. The term "straight bankruptcy" generally refers to liquidation proceedings, and is now
delineated in chapter 7 of the new Act. See 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 701-766 (Supp. 11 1978).
9. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 157. The Commission noted that while use of
chapter 13 appears to follow regional lines, there has been a surprising variety in usage of wage
earner relief among districts within the same area of the country and even within the same
state.
10. See text accompanying notes 12-17 infra.
11. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 158. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 1,
at 13, wherein it was noted that:
Chapter XIII cases can require considerable time and effort from both bankruptcy
judges and debtor attorneys. . . . Certainly related to these difficulties are the lack
of national uniformity in handling such cases, the length of time such cases must
necessarily remain pending and the differences in state exemption and garnishment
laws.
12. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 606(3), (8), 52 Stat. 930, as amended by Act of Dec. 29, 1950,
ch. 1193, 64 Stat. 1134 (originally codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1006(3), (8) (1976)) (repealed 1979).
13. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 661, 52 Stat. 936 (1938), as amended by Act of July 7, 1952,
ch. 579, § 52, 66 Stat. 437 (originally codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1976)) (repealed 1979).
14. Id.
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debtor's co-signers, 15 and the erratic treatment of secured creditors. 16 The
success of a debtor who proceeded with a plan in spite of these obstacles
depended heavily on the chapter XIII expertise of both the debtor's attorney
and the court administering the estate. An inexperienced attorney frequently
would decide that it was simpler for the debtor to file for straight bankruptcy
rather than to proceed with the administratively demanding wage earner
plan. 17 The bankruptcy judge also might be unenthusiastic about chapter
XIII relief because the debtor's case would usually involve a lengthy docket
tenure while the plan was being completed.
Another problem attendant upon court-administered wage earner plans
involves the courts' inadequacy to supervise lengthy payout plans. This has
led in some cases to the debtor's being forced to make repayments under
the court's supervision for as much as seven to ten years-a situation un-
comfortably analogous to indentured servitude. 18 In an attempt to alleviate
these and other recurring problems, the new chapter 13 offers significant
reforms which should make it an attractive alternative for the increasing
number of consumer-debtors, 19 and also for those sole proprietors who may
be able to obtain chapter 13 relief as well. 20
ELIGIBILITY
Chapter 13 of the new Bankruptcy Reform Act permits the financial re-
habilitation of an "individual with regular income." 21 This provision is an
expansion of the 1938 Act, which had limited chapter XIII relief to those
"whose principal income [was] derived from wages, salary, or commis-
sions. '22 The obvious impact of the new provision is that financially trou-
15. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13. See also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 121-22, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 289-93 [hereinafter cited
as HOUSE REPORT].
16. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
17. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 158.
18. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 117.
19. The obsolescence of former chapter XIII is demonstrated by the dramatic increase in the
number of consumer bankruptcies since that time. Between 1946 and 1967, the number of
nonbusiness bankruptcies rose from 8,566 to 191,729, and the amount of personal debt out-
standing increased from $31.4 billion to $338.2 billion in the same period of years. COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 7, at 33.
20. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text infra.
21. 11 U.S.C. app. § 101(24) (Supp. 11 1978) (emphasis added).
22. Under the former Act, a chapter XIII "wage earner" was defined as "an individual
whose principal income is derived from wages, salary or commissions." Chandler Act, ch. 575,
§ 606, 52 Stat. 930 (1938), as amended by Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1193, 64 Stat. 1134 (origi-
nally codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1006(8) (1976)) (repealed 1979). The courts have interpreted "wage
earner" very broadly. E.g., In re White Birch Park, 471 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(debtors who received compensation for services to chaptwr XI estate adjudged wage earners);
In re Reed, 368 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Va. 1968) (self-employed carpenter who worked with his
1979] 1047CHAPTER 13
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bled sole proprietors and professionals with "regular income" 23 who wish to
continue doing business while performing under the plan now will have an
inexpensive alternative to the expensive and technical chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion. 24 This significant change will affect, for example, doctors, accountants,
and individual proprietors, who often have chosen to liquidate their assets in
straight bankruptcy rather than deal with the complexities of a chapter 11
reorganization. 25 The new Act recognizes that the distinction between a
self-employed barber or grocer and an employee-barber or grocer is slight;
both should be able to enjoy the benefits of chapter 13 rehabilitation. 26
The expansion of chapter 13 eligibility compelled the enactment of a cor-
responding limitation not present in the old Bankruptcy Act. The new Act
limits chapter 13 relief to individuals with less than $100,000 in noncon-
tingent, liquidated, unsecured debts and less than $350,000 in noncontin-
gent, liquidated, secured debts.2 7  A second limitation is imposed on the
non-wage earner seeking chapter 13 relief. He or she must have regular
income-that is, income sufficiently stable and regular to enable him or her
to make periodic payments under the plan.2 8  Having satisfied these two
own tools for a number of different persons, none of whom withheld taxes from his earnings,
deemed a wage earner); In re Bradford, 268 F. Supp. 896 (N.D. Ala. 1967) (debtor whose
principal source of income was derived from social security benefits qualified as a wage earner);
Appeal of Shamma, 117 N.H. 70, 369 A.2d 192 (1977) (debtor who earned his living by instal-
ling carpeting for many different customers hiring his services adjudged a wage earner). The
new Act adopts this more liberal interpretation of the term "wage earner" and substitutes the
term "individual with regular income." 11 U.S.C. app. § 101(24) (Supp. II 1978).
It should be noted that the old Act contained two "wage earner" provisions. Section 1(32)
exempted wage earners from involuntary bankruptcy under chapters I to VII. 11 U.S.C. § 1(32)
(1976) (repealed 1979). At least one case had held that a person may be a wage earner for
purposes of chapter XIII but not be one within the meaning of § 1(32). Rice v. Mimms, 291
F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1961).
23. Even individuals on pensions, social security, or welfare may use chapter 13 if the in-
come they receive is regular and stable enough for them to make periodic payments under a
plan. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 119.
24. See 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 1101-1174 (Supp. II 1978). Chapter 11 provides for the reorganiza-
tion of financially troubled business entities by adjustment of their debts and equity interests.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
25. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 119.
26. While petitions for liquidation or reorganization may be filed under chapters 7 and 11
for corporations, partnerships and individuals, 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 101(31), 109(b), (d) (Supp. II
1978), chapter 13 is limited exclusively to individuals. Id. § 109(e).
27. 11 U.S.C. app. § 109(e) (Supp. II 1978). See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 119, where
these limits are interpreted as creating an irrebuttable presumption that chapter 13 is inappro-
priate for individuals with larger debts. Addressing the possibility that a small farmer with a
$350,000 mortgage would be denied chapter 13 relief, while a not-so-small business with less
indebtedness could file for such relief, the report noted that the benefits the chapter provides to
small proprietors outweigh any countervailing abuse caused by allowing coverage to these larger
proprietors. Id.
28. 11 U.S.C. app. § 101(24) (Supp. II 1978). See note 23 supra. A husband and wife who
file a joint petition present the only exception to the requirement that all persons filing a
chapter 13 petition have regular income. A married couple is allowed to file a joint petition, and
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requirements, the self-employed debtor will be able to avoid the chapter 11
reorganization and to share the chapter 13 benefits previously reserved for
wage earners alone.
THE PLAN
As under former law, the debtor is given the exclusive right to submit to
the court a plan 29 for the settlement, satisfaction, and discharge of his or her
secured as well as unsecured debts. The debtor's plan may provide for an
extension of time for the debt repayment, reduction in the amount to be
paid, or both. The debtor is still required to provide for submission of all, or
a sufficient portion of, his or her future earnings to the bankruptcy trustee in
order to meet the obligations under the plan. 30 A new provision allows for
part of the payment to come from a second source-the use or sale of the
estate or property of the debtor. 31 The new Act also attempts to prevent
the prolonged servitude of unsupervised debtors 32 by limiting the plan's du-
ration to three years, with a possible extension for cause to a maximum of
five years. 33
Of special interest in chapter 13 practice is the debtor's proposal for the
treatment of claims. In a new provision, the revised Act specifically allows for
modification of the rights of both secured and unsecured creditors. 34  An
exception is provided for those secured claims secured solely by an interest
in the debtor's principal residence. 35  The plan also may cure or waive any
default-3 6-including default on a claim in which the last payment is due
after the date of final payment under the plan. 37 An example of this type is
a delinquent real estate mortgage. The plan must provide for the default to
be cured within a reasonable time, and the regular mortgage payments must
be maintained while the case is pending. 38 These liberal allowances for the
it is not essential that both spouses individually maintain a steady income. 11 U.S.C. app.
§ 109(e) (Supp. 11 1978).
29. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1321 (Supp. II 1978). For a description of the plan's contents, see id.
§ 1322.
30. Compare 11 U.S.C. app. § 1322(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978) with Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 646,
52 Stat. 934 (1938) (codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1046(4) (1976)) (repealed 1979).
31. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1322(b)(8) (Supp. II 1978). It is essential, however, that part of the
payments under the plan come from future income. Id. § 1322 (a)(1).
32. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
33. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1322(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
34. See text accompanying notes 41, 47-56 infra. The only creditors who must be promised
payment in full under the plan are the holder of a priority claim specified in § 507 of the Act and
the holder of a secured claim secured by the debtor's principal residence. 11 U.S.C. app.
§ 1322(a)(2), (b)(2) (Supp. II 1978). But see S. 305, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1322(a)(2) (1979)
[hereinafter cited as SENATE BILL] which would provide for full payment of all secured claims
for tax liabilities of the debtor.
35. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1322(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
36. Id. § 1322(b)(3).
37. Id. § 1322(b)(5).
38. Id.
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plan's contents are tempered only by requirements for the court's confirma-
tion. 39 However, these requirements also have been liberalized. 40
CONFIRMATION
There are two significant changes in the new Act that affect the court's
confirmation of the debtor's plan. First, consent of a majority of the debtor's
unsecured creditors is no longer required. 41 The former law discouraged
the debtor from offering less than 100 percent repayment to creditors out of
fear that they would not accept any compromise. 42 Accordingly, the debtor
often saddled him or herself with a repayment plan that was overly burden-
some. Because of this, the debtor may have been forced later to abandon the
plan and to liquidate assets in straight bankruptcy. 43 Because the consent
of the unsecured creditors is no longer required, 4 the court will inspect the
plan and confirm it45 if all unsecured creditors will receive at a minimum
the amount that would be obtainable under a chaper 7 liquidation. 46 This
practical provision guarantees the unsecured creditor at least chapter 7 re-
payment and provides the debtor with incentive to elect this appealing al-
ternative to liquidation.
The Act also has modified significantly the rights of the secured creditor in
this area. Under the former statute, the debtor needed to secure the ap-
proval of any secured creditor "dealt with" by the plan. 47 Some judicial
opinions interpreted this provision to include secured creditors whose con-
tract rights were affected in any way. 48 This strict interpretation was
39. See notes 41-56 and accompanying text, infra.
40. Id. Under § 1327(a), creditors are bound by the debtor's confirmed plan, whether or not
they object to it. This is true even though a creditor's interest is not provided for in the plan.
Another section provides for modification of the debtor's plan after confirmation. 11 U.S.C. app.
§ 1329 (Supp. II 1978).
41. Compare 11 U.S.C. app. § 1325 (Supp. II 1978) with Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 652, 52
Stat. 934 (1938) (originally codifed in 11 U.S.C. § 1052(1) (1976)) (repealed 1979).
42. See Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 661, 52 Stat. 936 (1938), as amended by Act of July 7,
1952, ch. 579, § 52, 66 Stat. 437 (originally codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1976)) (repealed 1979),
which provided for a suspension of the statutes of limitations affecting claims and interests while
a proceeding was pending under this chapter.
43. See HousE REPORT, supra note 15, at 123.
44. See note 41 supra.
45. There are certain procedural and good-faith prerequisites to confirmation that also must
be met. See 11 U.S.C. app. § 1325(a)(1)-(3), (6) (Supp. 11 1978).
46. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1325(a)(4) (Supp. II 1978). In deciding whether the debtor's plan will
provide the creditors with repayment equal to that available under a chapter 7 liquidation, the
bankruptcy court will consider the value of the exemptions which would be available to the
debtor in a chapter 13 proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. app. § 522 (Supp. 11 1978).
47. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 652, 52 Stat. 934 (1938) (originally codified in 11 U.S.C. app.
§ 1052(1) (1976)) (repealed 1979).
48. See, e.g., In re Rutledge, 277 F. Supp. 933 (D.C. Ark. 1967) (secured creditor could
reject a plan that proposed full monthly payments and curing of delinquent payments within "a
1050
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eroded somewhat by more recent cases, 49 and the new Act further limits
the rights of secured creditors. If the secured creditor accepts the plan as
proposed, there is, of course, no confirmation problem.50 If the creditor
objects to the debtor's plan, however, the court will nonetheless, if the
debtor returns the security to the creditor, confirm the plan. 51  If the cred-
itor objects to the plan, and the debtor wishes to retain the security, the
court will confirm the plan provided that the creditor is allowed to retain the
lien securing the claim and the debtor proposes payments equal to the value
of the security. 52  This "cram down" provision will force the secured creditor
to accept any plan that offers repayment of the actual value of the se-
curity. 53 Any remaining contract balance will be considered an unsecured
claim and treated as identical to other unsecured claims, i.e., it will usually
be scaled down. 54
The rights of the secured creditor can be affected in one final manner by
the confirmation of the chapter 13 plan. The chapter 13 debtor is allowed to
exempt certain collateral under state law or the liberal federal provision. 55
Upon the debtor's exercise of this right, the holder of either a judicial lien or
a non-possessory, non-purchase money security interest in certain of the
reasonable lengd, of time"); In re Pappas, 216 F. Supp. 819 (D.C. Ohio 1962) (debtor's plan
"dealt with" secured creditor who would not have been paid according to the terms of the
instrument creating the debt and thus would have become an involuntary participant in the
plan, if such was confirmed).
49. See, e.g., Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 475 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1973) (under
certain circumstances, for equitable reasons, a court can enjoin secured creditor from reclaiming
chattel after disabled debtor failed to meet plan payments); In re Garcia, 396 F. Supp. 518
(C.D. Cal. 1974) (creditor's claim was secured only to the value of the chattel, and he was not
"dealt with" by a plan including payments to that extent); In re Wilder, 225 F. Supp. 67 (M.D.
Ga. 1963) (creditor was forced to accept a plan that included gradual repayment of a two month
arrearage).
50. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1325(a)(5) (Supp. II 1978).
51. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(C).
52. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(B).
53. While upon first inspection this provision appears to be unfair to the holder of a security
interest, it merely recognizes the financial realities of the secured creditor-debtor relationship.
If the debtor elects not to seek chapter 13 relief, the creditor will be forced to repossess the
secured goods and to sell them at a price that is quite possibly below their value to the debtor.
Under the statute, the court will insist that the plan compensate the creditor for the value of
the secured goods, yet the debtor will retain possession of the goods and avoid the high cost of
their replacement. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 124. See also 11 U.S.C. app. § 722
(Supp. II 1978) (allowing the debtor in a straight bankruptcy proceeding to redeem personal
property by paying the amount of the secured claim).
54. 11 U.S.C. app. § 506(a) (Supp. II 1978). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 68. By
limiting the secured creditor's veto power to those plans that have not proposed payment of the
value of the collateral, the new Act radically restricts the secured creditor's former power to
veto any plan that adversely affects his or her claim. See notes 47-48 and accompanying text
supra.
55. See 11 U.S.C. app. § 522(b) (Supp. II 1978); id. § 103(a).
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exempt property will have the lien set aside and will be treated as an unse-
cured creditor to the extent of this claim. 56
THE EFFECT OF FILING
The chapter 13 proceeding can be initiated only by the voluntary petition
of an eligible debtor. 57 Chapter 13 relief can be sought either in an original
petition or in a conversion from a pending chapter 7 or chapter 11 proceed-
ing. 58 A new provision permits a husband and wife to file jointly under one
petition. The court then determines, for ease of administration, the extent to
which the debtors' estates should be consolidated. 59
As under former law, the voluntary filing of the chapter 13 petition consti-
tutes the order for relief. 60 Unless the plan or order of confirmation
specifies to the contrary, the debtor will be allowed to remain in possession
of his or her property after filing. 61 This provision will have a great impact
under the new Act because it will be applied in conjunction with the ex-
panded eligibility requirements. 62 The sole proprietor who elects chapter
13 relief now may retain possession of his or her business assets and thus
continue business operations during administration of the plan. 63 Indeed,
with certain limitations, the small business debtor will be able to use, lease,
or sell property of the estate in the normal course of business, 64 and to
56. Id. § 522(f). Included in this list are exempt household furnishings, household goods,
wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, some jewelry and musical instruments, tools
of trade, professional books, and professionally-prescribed health aids. See also id. § 522(d).
57. Id. §§ 301, 303(a). The House Committee on the Judiciary of the 90th Congress consid-
ered and "firmly rejected" the idea of an involuntary or mandatory chapter 13 proceeding,
citing a possible violation of the thirteenth amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 120, citing Hearings on H.R. 1057 and H.R. 5771 Before
Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The House
also noted the difficulties of forcing an unwilling debtor to cooperate in a repayment plan re-
quiring prolonged cooperation from all parties. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 120. This
same policy consideration was cited by the Bankruptcy Commission in rejecting a proposal that
a debtor be permitted to file for straight bankruptcy only if he or she could show that chapter
13 relief was inappropriate. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 158-59.
58. See 11 U.S.C. app. § 706(a), 1112(d) (Supp. 11 1978). A debtor may also convert from a
chapter 13 proceeding to a chapter 7 proceeding. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1307(a) (Supp. II 1978). The
court will not enforce waivers of the right to convert from either chapter 7 to chapters 13 or 11,
nor from chapter 13 to chapter 7, Id. §§ 706(a), 1307(a). In addition, a debtor may request a
dismissal of the chapter 13 proceeding at any time, unless it has been converted under § 706 or
§ 1112(a). 11 U.S.C. app. § 1307(b) (Supp. II 1978).
59. 11 U.S.C. app. § 302 (Supp. 11 1978). The spouses' aggregate debts cannot exceed the
debt ceiling that is imposed upon the individual chapter 13 debtor. Id. § 109(e). See note 27
and accompanying text supra. It is merely required, however, that only one of the two spouses
maintain a regular income. 11 U.S.C. app. § 109(e) (Supp. II 1978).
60. Id. § 301.
61. Id. § 1306(b).
62. See notes 21-28 and accompanying text supra.
63. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1304(b) (Supp. II 1978).
64. Id. § 363(c)(1). While the debtor enjoys liberal rights to deal with the physical property
of the estate, he or she may not use, sell, or lease "cash collateral" unless either the consent of
1052
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issue certificates of indebtedness to obtain cash or physical property neces-
sary to continue operations.6 5  The potential impact of this is substantial.
To the debtor, continued business operations may mean a fresh start and
greater self-respect; to the creditor, it may mean collecting part or all of the
amount owing.
The filing of the chapter 13 petition also effectuates an automatic stay of
the commencement or the continuation of any action against the debtor, or
his or her property, arising after the filing of the petition. 66 Creditors may
not create, perfect, or enforce liens against the debtor's property; they may
not enforce previously obtained judgments or preexisting claims against the
debtor; nor may they pursue the self-help or setoff to effect any recovery. 67
Not all proceedings against the debtor are automatically stayed; a criminal
proceeding, for example, is one of the exceptions. 68 However, even the
actions that are not automatically stayed may be enjoined under other
statutory provisions. 69
A second type of creditor stay makes its debut in the new chapter 13.
Claims against co-signers on a consumer debt now will be automatically
stayed. 70 This provision should encourage the use of chapter 13 relief be-
cause the debtor will be able to complete an orderly repayment plan without
all parties having an interest in the collateral or court authorization has been obtained. Id.
§ 363(c)(2). The section defines "cash collateral" as cash, negotiable instruments, documents of
title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents in which the estate and another
entity have an interest, Id. § 363(a). Thus, the chapter 13 business debtor is prohibited from
entering transactions for the transfer of this "soft collateral" when it is subject to a lien or the
co-ownership rights of another person. This restriction applies also to "hard collateral" that is
subject to a lien at the time of confirmation of the plan, is disposed of by the debtor, and comes
back into the estate as "soft" or cash collateral. The property in this new form again will be
subject to the § 363 restrictions on free transfer. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 55. But
see SENATE BILL, supra note 34, at § 363(a), which would also include the proceeds, products,
offspring, rents, or profits of property subject to a security interest within the definition of the
term cash collateral.
65. 11 U.S.C. app. § 364(a) (Supp. II 1978). This provision allows the business debtor to
incur unsecured debts in the ordinary course of business. Secured debts can be incurred only if
the debtor complies with further requirements of the section. See id. § 364(c), (d); HousE
REPORT, supra note 15, at 346-47.
66. 11 U.S.C. app. § 362(a) (Supp. II 1978).
67. Id. § 362(a). The automatic stay provision also existed in the old Bankruptcy Act. See
Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 614, 52 Stat. 931 (1938) (originally codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1014
(1976)) (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 401. However, the Reform Act includes a more
detailed listing of actions stayed by commencement of the case. Furthermore, inclusion of the
stay provision in chapter 3 of the new Act makes it applicable to bankruptcy proceedings under
all chapters of the act. See 11 U.S.C. app. § 103(a) (Supp. II 1978).
68. 11 U.S.C. app. § 362(b) (Supp. II 1978). Other exceptions include certain attempts to
recover alimony or support, and certain governmental actions against the debtor.
69. See, e.g., The All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1651 (1970). Accordingly, when confronted
by an action that is excepted from the automatic stay provision, the debtor must petition the
court for an injunction, and the court will decide whether the requested stay would be equita-
ble in light of the particular facts of the case, See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 342.
70. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1301 (Supp. II 1978).
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yielding to the indirect pressures from creditors seeking repayment from the
debtor's co-signing friends or relatives. 71 If the co-signer is a guarantor or
surety that has guaranteed the debt in the regular course of a guaranty busi-
ness, however, the stay will not be operative. 72 Further, the automatic stay
of collection actions against the debtor's co-signers is intended to apply only
to consumer debts, 73 i.e., those incurred primarily for a "personal, house-
hold, or family purpose," 74 because the co-signer of a business debt is more
likely to foresee the possibility of default and eventual creditor pressure.
CONVERSION
The provisions of chapter 13 offer the debtor significant incentives for
choosing a periodic repayment plan over other, more drastic forms of re-
lief. There will be occasions, moreover, when an eligible debtor's most ap-
propriate remedy will be converting to a chapter 13 plan from straight bank-
ruptcy under chapter 7 7 5 or reorganization under chapter 11.76
While creditors cannot file an involuntary chapter 13 case against a
debtor, 77 eligible debtors have the right to convert their involuntary chapter
7 or chapter 11 proceedings into a chapter 13 proceeding. 78 This right
remains unchanged from the former law, 79 yet because of the previously
discussed expansion of chapter 13's advantages, more debtors will use the
conversion provisions. The new Act, however, effectuates two changes in
conversion practice. The first is a provision allowing the court to convert,
after notice and a hearing, a chapter 13 case to a chapter 11 case at the
preconfirmation request of any interested party. 80 This situation-although
71. As noted in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 121, most of these co-signers are not
aware of the consequences of their action and have signed merely as a favor to the debtor.
Accordingly, the advantage given to creditors, who are in a position to apply moral pressure to
the debtor by moving against his or her friends and relatives, was seen as an unfair advantage
and disproportionate to the legitimate financial considerations of co-signing.
72. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1301(a)(1) (Supp. I 1978).
73. Id. 9 1301(a).
74. Id. 9 101(0. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 122. The stay of actions against co-signers
is not unlimited, however. The stay will be lifted to the extent that the debtor's repayment plan
will not pay a portion of the creditor's claim. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1301(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1978). The
stay also will not apply if the co-debtor received consideration for the claim and thus was an
actual debtor. Id. § 1301(c)(1). Finally, the stay will be lifted if the continuance of the stay
would result in irreparable harm to the creditor. Id. § 1301(c)(3). Thus, the creditor could seek to
have the stay lifted if it appeared that for some reason the co-debtor soon would be unable to
meet his or her obligation should the debtor default. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at
122.
75. 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 701-66 (Supp. II 1978).76. Id. §§ 1101-74.
77. See note 57 supra.
78. See 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 706(a), 1112(d) (Supp. 11 1978).
79. See Chandler Act, ch. 575, §§ 621-622, 52 Stat. 931 (1938) (originally codified in 11
U.S.C. §§ 1021-1022 (1976)) (repealed 1979).
80. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1307(d) (Supp. II 1978). This provision does not apply if the debtor is
a farmer. Id. § 1307(e). See id. § 101(17), (18) (definitions of farmer and farming operation).
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some courts allowed it-should not have arisen under the former Bank-
ruptcy Act, for any business debtor eligible for chapter 11 relief would not
have been able to file a chapter 13 petition initially. 81
A second revision of conversion proceedings allows the court, for
"cause," 82 to dismiss a chapter 13 case or to convert it to a chapter 7 case
without the debtor's consent, as long as there is notice and a hearing. 83 The
court must decide what is in the best interests of both creditors and the
estate. 84 A potential problem may arise under this new provision. Should
the court determine that conversion to a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding
would be appropriate, a literal reading of the chapter 13 definition of "prop-
erty of the estate" 85 could harm the defendant's chances for eventual relief.
Because the chapter 13 estate includes all property and earnings which the
debtor has acquired after commencement of the case, but before its conver-
sion or dismissal, 86 this after-acquired property must be turned over to a
trustee and become available to creditors in the converted chapter 7
case. 87 Thus, despite the fact that in most cases a debtor already has spent
his or her post-petition income on living expenses and payments to the chap-
ter 13 trustee, he or she could be denied a chapter 7 discharge for refusing
to obey a court-ordered turnover to these earnings to the chapter 7
trustee.8 8 To avoid this dilemma a debtor should not move to convert an
unsuccessful chapter 13 to chapter 7. Instead he or she should attempt to
convince the court to dismiss the case and then file an original chapter 7
petition.
DISCHARGE
The scope of the chapter 13 discharge has been expanded by the new Act.
Under the old Act, a two-step process was required before a debtor could be
Also, the court will exercise its discretion in granting the conversion and will consider, among
other factors, the nature of the debtor's business. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 428. For
definition of the phrase "after notice and a hearing," see 11 U.S.C. app. § 102(1) (Supp. II 1978).
81. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
82. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1307(c) (Supp. II 1978). Possible causes listed in the section include:
unreasonable and prejudicial delay by the debtor, court denial of confirmation of the chapter 13
plan, and material default by the debtor under an existing plan.
83. Id. The court may not, however, convert a chapter 13 case to a chapter 7 or 11 case if
the debtor is a farmer. Id. § 1307(e).
84. Id. § 1307(c).
85. Id. The section defines estate property as including all of the properties specified in 11
U.S.C. app. § 541 (Supp. II 1978) (the general estate property provision), as well as property
acquired after commencement of the case but before its dismissal, conversion, or completion.
86. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1306 (Supp. II 1978).
87. Compare 11 U.S.C. app. § 1306(b) (Supp. 11 1978) (the chapter 13 debtor remains in
possession of estate property) with 11 U.S.C. app. § 521(3) (Supp. II 1978) (the bankruptcy
debtor will surrender to the trustee all estate property).
88. See 11 U.S.C. app. § 727(a)(2)(A) (Supp. II 1978).
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discharged from his or her debts. 89 First, the court would make a determi-
nation whether the debtor might be granted a discharge. 90 At that time,
the debtor could have waived the right to discharge. 91 Also, the court
would entertain objections to discharge from the creditors. 92 If the dis-
charge was not granted, the creditors could proceed with their collection
efforts. If the discharge was granted, the court proceeded to the second step,
which was a determination of the dischargeability of specific debts. 93  Under
the new Act, this procedure is eliminated and an automatic two-step proce-
dure is substituted. First, the debtor files a plan that provides a schedule
whereby the debtor's assets will be used to satisfy all debts included in the
periodic repayment plan. 94 Second, after completion of all payments under
an approved plan, the court shall grant a discharge to the debtor of all debts
included within the plan9 5 except for certain non-dischargeable debts:
alimony, child support, or maintenance, 96 or certain secured long-term obli-
gations. 97
Another modification of the discharge provision involves the so-called
"hardship" discharge. Under the old Act, the court, after three years from
confirmation of the plan, might have granted a discharge, even though the
debtor had not completed the payments, where failure to do so was the
result of circumstances for which the debtor could not be held account-
able. 98 The new Act provides that the court may grant a discharge at any
89. Chandler Act, ch. 575, §§ 14, 17, 52 Stat. 850, 851 (1938) (originally codified in 11
U.S.C. §§ 32, 35 (1976)) (repealed 1979). See generally D. GILL, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY
AND WAGE EARNER PLANS § 7.1 (1971).
90. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 14 (a), 52 Stat. 850 (1938) (originally codified in 11 U.S.C.
§ 32(a) (1976)) (repealed 1979).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 14(b) (11 U.S.C. § 32(b)(1)).
93. Id. Among non-dischargeable debts under the old Act were taxes which became due and
owing the United States or any state or subdivision thereof within three years preceding bank-
ruptcy; any property or money obtained by false pretenses or false representations or any
property acquired by credit which was obtained in reliance upon a material false statement in
writing; debts not properly scheduled in time for proof and allowance; debts created by fraud,
misrepresentation, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while the debtor was acting
as an officer in any fiduciary capacity; wages or earnings due an employee for services rendered
or earnings retained by the employer; alimony, maintenance, child support, seduction of an
unmarried female, breach of promise to marry accompanied by seduction, or criminal conver-
sion; liabilities for wilful or malicious injury to the person or property of another. Id. § 17, 52
Stat. 851 (11 U.S.C. § 35).
94. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1322 (Supp. II 1978).
95. Id. § 1328(a).
96. Id. § 523(a)(5). Alimony and child support are not excepted if they have been assigned
to another. Id. § 523(a)(5)(A). See also Swann, Dischargeability of Domestic Obligations in
Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. REv. 231 (1976).
97. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1322(b)(5) (Supp. II 1978).
98. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 661, 52 Stat. 936 (1938), as amended by Act of July 7, 1952,
ch. 579, § 52, 66 Stat. 437 (originally codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1976)) (repealed 1979).
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time after confirmation of the plan if the debtor's failure to complete pay-
ments under the plan was due to circumstances for which the debtor should
not justly be held accountable, 99 but only if the creditors have already re-
ceived the same amount they would have under a straight bankruptcy 00
and where modification of the plan is not practicable. 101 Debts discharged
under this provision are subject to the same exceptions as those under a
regular chapter 7 discharge. 10 2
The debtor who receives either a regular or hardship discharge under
chapter 13 may not file a chapter 7 liquidation for six years after com-
mencement of the chapter 13 proceeding, unless payments under the plan
totalled 100 percent of the allowed unsecured claims 103 or 70 percent of
such claims, and the plan was proposed by the debtor in good faith and was
the debtor's "best effort." 104 There is no similar six year bar in chapter 13
itself. Thus, a debtor who has received a discharge under chapter 7, or
under a chapter 13 composition plan, may file under chapter 13 and receive
a discharge under any kind of plan without waiting six years. 105
THE CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE
Under the new Act, the court may appoint one person to serve as a stand-
ing chapter 13 trustee. 106 However, in eighteen designated judicial dis-
tricts a United States Trustee shall be appointed. 107 The United States
Trustee will then appoint a standing trustee who will serve as trustee in the
case,108 or, where no standing trustee is appointed, the United States Trustee
Circumstances beyond the debtor's control would include injury that restricted the debtor's
earning ability and, therefore, his or her performance under the wage earner plan. Thomson v.
Ford Motor Credit Co., 475 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1973).
99. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1328(b)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
100. Id. § 1328(b). The House Judiciary Committee has predicted that this provision will
increase the success rate of chapter 13 plans because debtors will have lost the existing "un-
natural incentive" to propose precisely a three year plan regardless of their circumstances. Also,
courts will be able to grant an early discharge in cases involving truly exceptional hardships.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 125.
101. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1329 (Supp. 11 1978). After confirmation, but prior to completion of
payments, the plan may be modified to increase or decrease the amount of the payments, to
alter the time permitted for the payments, to change the amount to be distributed to a creditor
under the plan, or to take account of any payment or claim made outside of the plan.
102. See notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text supra.
103. 11 U.S.C. app. § 727(a)(9)(A) (Supp. 11 1978).
104. Id. § 727(a)(9)(B). The factors which the court should take into account to determine the
debtor's "best effort" include the debtor's assets, reasonable expenses, stability of debtor's
employment, age of the debtor, and the number of the debtor's dependents. 124 CONG. REC.
S 17415 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remark of Rep. DeConcini), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6529.
105. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1328(a) (Supp. II 1978).
106. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1302(d) (Supp. 1 1978). See generally, HousE REPORT, supra note 15,
at 101-02.
107. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1501 (Supp. II 1978).
108. Id. § 151302.
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will serve as trustee in the case. 10 9 The duties of all trustees include
accounting for property received into the estate, investigating the financial
affairs of the debtor, examining proofs of claims, opposing discharge if advis-
able, furnishing necessary information on the estate to any party in interest
requesting it, and making a final report and accounting to the court. 110 In
addition to these duties, the chapter 13 trustee must be present and af-
forded an opportunity to be heard at any hearing concerning the value of
property subject to a lien confirmation or modification of the plan, and shall
advise the debtor on all non-legal matters relating to the plan. "I When the
United States Trustee acts as trustee in the case, he or she may be paid no
compensation out of the estate, thus providing more available funds for cred-
itors. 112
CONCLUSION
The underlying premise of the Bankruptcy Reform Act appears to be that
liquidation under chapter 7 should be used as a last resort and that eligible
debtors should instead attempt a chapter 13 rehabilitation plan. There
should be a marked increase in the number of chapter 13 cases filed nation-
ally because of the new statute. Practitioners will realize the potential of
chapter 13 as an inexpensive, effective means of rehabilitating a qualified
debtor because of its liberalized provisions: automatic stays of actions against
both debtors and co-debtors, confirmation of plans without unsecured cred-
itors' consent, cram down provisions against secured creditors, avoidance of
most chapter 7 and 11 exceptions to discharge, and the availability of a hard-
ship discharge at any time after confirmation.
109. Id. § 151302(a).
110. Id. § 704(2), (4), (5), (6), (8). But see SENATE BILL, supra note 34, § 704(8), which
would add to the trustee's duties the obligation of interim reports on the condition of the estate.
111. Id. § 151302(b).
112. Id. § 151326. See also Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, EXPLANATION (CCH) 1505
(December, 1978).
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